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While the accounting literature has extensively studied the role of transfer pricing (TP) within 
the management control system (MCS) of companies, MCS issues related to cross-border 
transfers have received far less attention. In this case study, we investigate how TP tax 
compliance influences responsibility accounting when one multinational enterprise (MNE) 
uses a single set of transfer prices for both tax compliance and management control. First, the 
MNE eliminated TP negotiation, leading to psychologically disagreeable and sometimes also 
economically harmful situations. Second, the firm administratively simplified the 
determination of profit margins to such an extent that it could lead to suboptimal business 
decisions. Third, tax compliance induced a profit center designation for business units that 
were primarily responsible for costs or revenues. The firm first coped with a mixed treatment 
of these responsibility centers, allowing them to be profit centers for tax purposes and cost or 
revenue centers for MCS purposes. Later, top management became convinced of the benefits 
of a profit-center treatment for all purposes and started to convert the pro-forma profit centers 
into real profit centers. Overall, this study contributes to the stream of research documenting 
and explaining how MCSs are designed and used under environmental pressures. 
 
 
Keywords: international transfer pricing, management control system, responsibility 
accounting, multinational enterprise. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this transfer pricing (TP) paper we empirically investigate how tax compliance 
influences responsibility accounting in one multinational enterprise (MNE) that uses a single 
set of transfer prices. International tax law is a crucial determinant of cross-border TP in 
MNEs. It imposes the arm’s length principle as the yardstick to judge the fairness and 
correctness of the TP system (Art. 9 OECD Model Tax Convention). The tax authorities take 
a ‘separate entity approach’ to investigate an MNE’s adherence to the arm’s length principle. 
This approach implies that MNEs need to be prepared to demonstrate that intercompany 
prices are in line with what would have been charged had the two companies not been related 
(OECD TP Guidelines 1995). The potential penalties, the risk of encountering economic 
double taxation, and the significant financial and reputation consequences in case of non-
compliance motivate MNEs to give high priority to TP tax compliance1 (Cools and 
Emmanuel 2007; The Economist 2004; Wright 2004, 2007). Under these regulatory 
constraints the majority of MNEs opt for a single set of transfer prices (also called one set of 
books) for both tax compliance and management control purposes (Ernst & Young 2003, 
2005). 
The arm’s length principle refers to the concept of profit centers, but it is not clear to 
what degree international tax law actually forces MNE subunits to behave as profit centers 
for all purposes. Management accounting and control textbooks tend to highlight the 
management control role of TP in profit centers, reflecting in this way the scarcity of TP 
research in other types of responsibility centers (Anthony and Govindarajan 2006; Hilton 
2005; Horngren et al. 2006; Simons 2000; Zimmerman 2003). Eccles (1985, 1986) is the only 
researcher who distinguishes between the degrees to which so-called profit centers display 
various responsibility center characteristics in a domestic setting, linking them to the use of 
different TP methods. International TP studies mention the relevance of responsibility 
accounting for cross-border TP without providing any explanation or illustration (Borkowski 
1992a; Emmanuel and Mehafdi 1994), or treat responsibility accounting merely as the degree 
of (de)centralization of the organizational structure without addressing related management 
control system (MCS) aspects (Narayanan and Smith 2000). Since empirical data on this 
topic are scarce, we use an in-depth case study in one MNE to identify and describe specific 
influences of tax compliance on the MNE’s responsibility center set-up and related 
management control issues. 
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First, we find that the MNE eliminated TP negotiation as part of its tax-compliance 
efforts. The consequent reduction in the sense of autonomy was mainly experienced as 
psychologically disagreeable and the loss of negotiation power sometimes also led to 
economically harmful situations. Second, tax compliance led the MNE to install uniform 
profit margins and mark-ups for all similar stages in the firm’s value chain. It was a 
simplification for administrative reasons, which made the MNE more confident that the tax 
authorities would fully understand and accept the TP policy in place. The uniform profit 
margins resulted in suboptimal decisions at some places in the firm. Third, tax compliance 
induced a profit center designation for business units that were primarily responsible for costs 
or revenues. The MNE initially coped with a mixed treatment of the responsibility centers, 
allowing them to be profit centers for tax purposes and another type of responsibility center 
for MCS purposes. A secondary effect was that top management started to see the benefits of 
profit-center treatment for all purposes. Consequently, they started to convert the pro-forma 
profit centers into real profit centers. 
This case study aims at contributing to the stream of research documenting and 
explaining how a company’s MCS is designed and used under environmental pressures, in 
this case caused by the arm’s length principle. It responds to the call for studies explaining 
how TP processes within the MCS are managed in practice (Spicer 1988; Colbert and Spicer 
1995; Cravens and Shearon 1996; Cravens 1997). Our research approach allows us to 
uncover aspects of TP that are typically not captured in analytic or survey studies. By 
generating new insights into the diverse policy issues underlying international TP, our study 
also contributes to enhancing understanding between tax, financial, and human resource 
managers within MNEs as well as between MNE senior management and the tax authorities. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we review the 
TP literature on the MCS and tax compliance objectives of TP and conclude by formulating a 
number of empirical questions. After describing the research method, we introduce the case 
company in terms of its organizational structure and TP policy. In the analysis section we 
identify specific influences of tax compliance on management control at our research site. We 
focus on subunit managers’ preferences and the MNE’s choices in terms of the responsibility 
accounting set-up and related performance measurement and evaluation system. The resulting 
tensions are discussed in terms of the negative and positive effects of TP tax compliance on 
the MNE’s MCS and, where relevant, related to the extant literature. Finally, we identify the 
limitations of this study and make suggestions for future research. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
We start by reviewing the survey literature to document the importance of the 
different TP objectives. Since the tax compliance objective is central to our study, we next 
look at international tax law to examine the reach of the arm’s length principle. This principle 
explicitly refers to profit centers, which leads us to review the MCS literature on 
responsibility accounting in relation to TP. Finally, we turn to the analytic TP literature that 
raises questions related to the trade-offs between tax and MCS TP objectives. Focusing on 
responsibility accounting choices under the constraint of tax compliant TP, we will study 
these questions in practice in one particular MNE. 
 
Management Control versus Tax Compliance Objectives of TP 
TP systems fulfill a variety of objectives in multi-divisional firms, which implies that 
trade-offs need to be made. The MCS literature has traditionally studied the role of TP in 
achieving goal congruence and in measuring and evaluating managerial performance 
(Abdallah 1989; Emmanuel and Mehafdi 1994). Within the MCS, transfer prices help value 
and coordinate the workflows of interdependent organizational units that are each held 
accountable for their financial performance (Simons 2000). In MNEs the design of the TP 
system can help achieve an additional set of goals, including profit maximization, cash flow, 
sales and marketing goals; minimizing taxes, duties, and tariffs; and achieving socio-political 
goals related to financial restrictions, currency fluctuations, and host country relations (Leitch 
and Barrett 1992; Dunning 1980). Over the last decades, TP regulations have become much 
more detailed and a growing number of national tax authorities have increased scrutiny of the 
TP policies implemented by local and foreign MNEs (Cools and Emmanuel 2007). This trend 
leads to an additional goal, TP tax compliance. The pressure MNEs feel today to comply with 
TP tax regulations is evidenced by the biennial Ernst & Young TP surveys (conducted since 
1995) that document regulatory activities and enforcement practices and describe MNEs’ 
experiences with TP audits around the world. 
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Studying the trade-offs between different TP objectives, other surveys indicate that 
MCS objectives continue to be taken into account when MNEs set their TP policies. In Tang 
and Chan’s (1979) study, US and Japanese MNEs ranked divisional performance evaluation 
as the fifth most important factor when deciding on their TP policy. Yunker (1982) found that 
MNEs using TP to increase overall profits place less emphasis on profit-oriented measures in 
divisional performance evaluation. Larger MNEs tend towards market-based transfer prices 
and use profit-oriented measures in the evaluation of subsidiary performance while cost-
based firms are more concerned with budgetary and goal-oriented performance criteria. 
Borkowski (1992a) identified the use of subsidiary profits for performance evaluation and 
degree of decentralization amongst the organizational determinants of international TP. In 
Tang’s 1992 survey of large US corporations, the importance of performance evaluation of 
foreign subsidiaries dropped from the fifth to the tenth place compared with his 1979 survey, 
while Tang’s 2002 survey confirms the role of divisional performance evaluation among the 
most important TP objectives of US MNEs. 
The extant survey literature documents the importance of the tax minimization 
objective and, as detailed in the previous paragraph, it points out that management control is 
not ignored. However, the dominance of the TP tax compliance objective has become 
significantly more important in recent years than these surveys suggest. Therefore, we now 
discuss the reach of the arm’s length principle, which guides national tax authorities when 
assessing the correctness and fairness of international TP systems. 
 
Tax Compliance: the Arm’s Length Principle 
Compliance with the arm’s length principle means that intra-firm transactions should 
be treated and priced as if they were undertaken under open market conditions under similar 
circumstances (OECD 1995). Tax authorities check the application of the arm’s length 
principle by investigating whether the financial results of the MNE’s divisions are 
comparable to those of independent enterprises. When they observe distortions in terms of tax 
liabilities of the associated enterprises and tax revenues of the host countries, tax authorities 
may adjust the profits of the associated enterprises2. Membership in a broader group - the 
MNE - is disregarded in taxation: each legal entity is treated as a separate and independent 
tax subject, which is presumed to strive for a profit of its own (OECD Model Tax 
Convention). The OECD Guidelines therefore explicitly assume that all local MNE subunits 
behave as profit centers and other types of responsibility centers are not mentioned.  
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In addition, the tax authorities become particularly suspicious when MNE subunits 
consistently realize losses (OECD 1995). 
In contrast to what we might expect based on the MCS literature, the OECD 
Guidelines do not accept negotiated transfer prices as a sufficient and valid proof of tax 
compliance: 
 
“Sometimes, it may occur that the relationship between associated 
enterprises may influence the outcome of the bargaining. Therefore, 
evidence of hard bargaining alone is not sufficient to establish that the 
dealings are at arm’s length.” (OECD 1995 §1.5) 
 
Instead, the OECD Guidelines recognize five TP methods that, depending on the 
circumstances and the characteristics of the transfer, provide a suitable application of the 
arm’s length principle: the comparable uncontrolled price, the cost-plus method, the resale-
minus method, the transactional net margin or comparable profit method, and the profit split 
method. 
The current TP rules entail extensive documentation requirements, urging MNEs to 
explicitly demonstrate how their TP policy respects the arm’s length principle. The functional 
analysis is a crucial part of the documentation, requiring a detailed analysis of the various 
functions undertaken, the assets used, and the risks taken by the different parties involved in 
the intra-firm transactions (IRS 1994; OECD 1995). However, national tax authorities 
interpret and implement the fluid arm’s length principle in different ways, reflecting long-
established domestic tax practices (Eden et al. 2001; Picciotto 1992). The resulting diverging 
approach to TP by different tax authorities worldwide is a growing concern for MNEs (Ernst 
& Young 2003). Finally, it is worthwhile to mention that the OECD Guidelines do not 
provide any recommendation about whether the arm’s length principle needs to be fulfilled 
using one versus two sets of TP books3. In addition, there are no statutory requirements in the 
US and in many other countries that stipulate that the incentive and tax TP be the same (Hyde 
and Choe 2005). 
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Management Control: Responsibility Accounting 
While the OECD TP Guidelines only acknowledge the existence of profit centers, the 
MCS literature on responsibility accounting identifies a variety of responsibility centers. 
Responsibility accounting refers to multi-divisional firms installing different types of 
responsibility centers to promote alignment between individual and corporate goals, 
depending on the decision rights delegated to the subunit managers (Vancil 1979; Horngren 
et al. 2006). It determines the range of performance measures used to evaluate a manager’s 
achievements under the imperative that this evaluation should best be based on what the 
manager controls (Demski and Sappington 1989; Zimmerman 2003). The ‘span of 
accountability’ (Simons 2000) might range from a narrow focus on spending or revenues in 
cost and revenue centers respectively to profit centers holding managers accountable for the 
impact of spending levels or even the efficient utilization of assets on revenues and profit4. 
Responsibility accounting has been an under-researched area, investigated primarily through 
principal-agent modeling of the link between controllability and informativeness (Holmstrom 
1979, 1982; Baiman and Demski 1980; Antle and Demski 1988). With the exceptions of 
Merchant (1987) and Rowe et al. (2007), empirical studies are scarce. 
In a domestic context, Eccles (1986) investigated the organization’s architecture in 
terms of three types of decision rights, possibly delegated to subunit  managers : 1) 
partitioning of subunit managers’ decision rights related to sourcing, i.e. the choice of a 
division’s suppliers and customers, and pricing, i.e. the setting of a transfer price for internal 
transactions, 2) measurement and evaluation of the subunit’s performance, and 3) rewarding 
and punishing the subunit managers for performance so as to achieve both efficiency and 
fairness objectives (Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1992; Zimmerman 2003). Eccles 
(1986) found that in companies following a vertical integration strategy, issues of TP and 
divisional role definition are interrelated. He concluded that subunits in real life are not 
simply cost centers or profit centers, and that the term ‘profit center’ covers various degrees 
of authority and autonomy of subunit managers (Eccles 1986; Vancil 1979). 
Given the scarcity of empirical studies, we set out to further explore how an MNE 
manages the requirements of the arm’s length principle – with its explicit focus on profit 
centers - versus management control preferences for different types of responsibility centers. 
We now first turn to the analytic TP literature, which can provide guidance to our study since 
it identifies a number of economically important questions in this context. 
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Trade-Offs between Tax Compliance and MCS Objectives of TP 
The analytic TP literature5 provides interesting insights into the trade-offs MNEs face 
when seeking to achieve both tax-related and management control objectives. More in 
particular, this research stream raises three important questions for which the models have to 
make explicit assumptions since a priori it is not clear how they are dealt with in practice. 
The first issue is whether one versus two or more sets of transfer prices should be used. 
Halpirin and Srinidhi (1991), Sansing (1999), Narayanan and Smith (2000), and Smith 
(2002a) derive one set of optimal transfer prices that reconciles managerial and tax objectives 
under certain static circumstances. In contrast, Smith (2002b), Baldenius et al. (2004), and 
Hyde and Choe (2005) model two distinct transfer prices, one to serve incentive purposes and 
the other to serve tax purposes. To prove that decoupling the internal transfer price from the 
arm’s length transfer price leads to the best overall firm results -- because tax regulations 
frequently do not capture the underlying economics of internal transfers -- Baldenius et al. 
(2004) calculate the ‘cost of conformity’ (i.e. resulting from using one set of books)6. Hyde 
and Choe (2005) examine the interdependence between the tax transfer price and the 
incentive transfer price, both when the incentive transfer price is negotiated and when it is 
dictated by the parent company. Even the analytic researchers modeling two sets of books 
recognize the common use of one set of transfer prices for reasons of simplicity, time and 
cost savings, and for preventing multiple transfer prices from becoming evidence in disputes 
with the tax authorities (Baldenius et al. 2004; Smith 2002b). 
The second issue is whether tax compliance is a (given) constraint or a decision 
variable. In Smith (2002b) and Hyde and Choe (2005) tax compliance is not assumed: the 
models take into account that the domestic division risks a penalty when a TP audit finds out 
that it deviated from arm’s length tax-admissible prices. By contrast, Baldenius et al. (2004) 
take tax compliance as given. 
The third issue is whether performance measures other than profit should be used. As 
an alternative to modeling separate sets of transfer prices to disentangle the tax and MCS 
objectives of TP, Smith (2002b) relaxes the common assumption that aggregate profit is used 
as the performance measure. Instead, he examines the use of performance measures 
independent of the transfer price. He finds that attaching different weights to performance 
versus other effort measures eliminates tax and incentive trade-offs even when the firm uses a 
single transfer price. 
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The economic relevance of the three TP questions identified above, calls for an 
investigation on how they are dealt with in practice. First, in terms of the number of TP 
books, Durst (2002) and the Ernst & Young surveys indicate that a single set of books for 
management and tax purposes prevails. 80 percent of the parent companies surveyed report 
using one set of transfer prices because 
 
“Alignment of transfer prices with management views of the business can 
enhance the defensibility of the transfer prices, ease the administrative 
burden, and add to the effectiveness of the TP program. In fact, in many 
countries, management accounts are the primary starting point in the 
determination of tax liability and differences between tax and management 
accounts are closely scrutinized.” (Ernst and Young 2003, 17) 
 
The prevalence of a single set of transfer prices is therefore reflected in the selection 
criteria for our research site. The second issue—whether tax compliance is a constraint or a 
decision variable—and the third issue—the performance measures used and the related 




We examined the impact of tax-compliant TP on responsibility accounting by 
conducting a case study at one MNE. Limiting the field study to a single MNE allowed us to 
examine in depth the complexity of the TP system in relation to its context (Otley 1999). To 
ensure comparability with the mainstream MCS literature on TP, this study focuses on the 
transfers of products, even though the internal provision of services will be mentioned for 
completeness where appropriate. The field study was conducted between 1999 and 2002 in 
the ‘Semiconductors’ Product Division of a large, mature, multi-divisional MNE. The MNE’s 
corporate tax department had expended significant efforts to motivate all product divisions to 
comply with the tax regulations in the different countries where the MNE was present. 
Theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt 1989) guided our choice of the research site, which was 
selected based on the following criteria: 
 
• Global presence: The MNE operated Semiconductors units worldwide, each subject to 
country-specific tax rules; it had an important presence in the US, the country with the 
most stringent tax legislation in the world (Eden et al. 2001; Cools and Emmanuel 
2007). 
• A large number of cross-border transactions: TP was particularly relevant in the 
complex domestic and international transaction environment of Semiconductors. 
• One set of TP books: Semiconductors implemented one set of TP books, which is in 
line with common TP practice today (Baldenius et al. 2004; Ernst & Young 2003). 
• Tax compliance: The MNE felt comfortable with the tax compliance aspects of its TP 
policy. Having been subjected to TP audits in various countries it had not encountered 
any major problems with the tax authorities involved. 
• Management control: A multidisciplinary workgroup had been involved to ensure 
compliance of Semiconductor’s TP policy with the tax rules. Controllers at different 
managerial levels played an important role during this process, to make sure MCS 
issues were not overlooked (Cools et al. 2008). 
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The case MNE provided access to management at all levels in the company. Access to 
top management was crucial to collect information on the company’s global TP policy and 
the division’s organization structure. Access to Semiconductors managers was important in 
order to gather information about the implementation of TP, the responsibility center 
structure and the related performance and reward issues. 
We designed our case study protocol and data analysis protocol (Yin 1994) to 
maximize the traceability of the research process (Ryan et al. 2002). We interviewed 23 
people at different levels in the organization between 1999 and 2002 for a total of 47 hours. 
An overview of the number of people involved at the different levels is provided in Table 1. 
The semi-structured interviews were guided by open-ended questions that were based on the 
domestic MCS TP literature and the TP tax literature. The questions were kept open enough 
so that unexpected findings could inform the data collection and theory development process. 
The interviews were completely transcribed7, giving us an overall view of the TP process. In 
addition, we collected 111 internal company documents related to TP. Table 2 provides an 
overview of the types of documents analyzed. 
 
Insert Table 1 and 2 About Here 
We followed Miles and Huberman’s (1998) recommendations for data reduction, data 
display, and conclusion drawing and verification. The data were reduced by preparing contact 
and document summaries. These summaries, together with all interview transcripts, were 
introduced into NUDIST, a qualitative data analysis software package. The software 
facilitated the coding of the data and enabled the systematic retrieval of all bits of information 
coded in the same way. Further analysis consisted of structuring the data by displaying them 
in thematic conceptual matrices. Verification consisted of cross-validating both the 
documents and oral stories and the different oral stories amongst each other. This 
triangulation was necessary to address potential problems of construct validity and to make 
our case study findings more accurate and convincing (Yin 2003; Miles and Huberman 
1998). 
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THE RESEARCH SITE 
In this section we introduce the Semiconductors Product Division of the selected 
MNE. In the semiconductor industry, the MNE was not among the largest global players in 
terms of volume, but by offering its customers tailor-made solutions in addition to standard 
products it had gained an important market position. In order to guarantee tax compliance, 
Semiconductors had gradually been reorganized along a matrix structure involving different 
stages and a profound consideration of the MCS objectives of the TP policy. Semiconductors 
implemented its TP policy along strict monitoring requirements (Cools et al. 2008). 
 
The Matrix Structure 
Semiconductors’ matrix structure involved a two-way flow of authority and 
responsibility (Mullins 2002; Haberberg and Rieple 2001; Bartlett and Ghoshall 1990). 
Insert Figure 1 and 2 About Here 
The first axis of the matrix structure, i.e. the segmentation of the organization into 
functional departments, provided a stable basis for specialized activities and a permanent 
location for staff members. Key activities along the functional axis of the matrix were (see 
Figure 1): 
• Operations: The main activities consisted of production, pre-testing, and storage in 
the product bank. From there the products moved to assembly and another testing 
phase. Production took place in semiconductor plants in the US and Europe. 
Assembly and testing often took place in low-cost labor countries in Asia but also in 
the production plants themselves. 
• Marketing and Sales: Regional sales organizations were responsible for distribution 
and storage of the semiconductors in the different continents, while national sales 
organizations represented the MNE in the customer’s country. The semiconductors 
went straight from the warehouse at the regional sales organization to the customer 
and did not physically pass through the national sales organizations. 
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• Other organizations involved were the Corporate Center, Technical Support Centers, 
and Application Laboratories. They took care of all activities not directly related to 
the goods flow8. 
 
The second flow of authority and responsibility in the matrix structure involved the 
product axis, along which Semiconductors was organized into groups of strategic business 
units (SBUs), either focusing on similar products or on operational activities and processes 
(see Figure 2): 
• The product SBUs were grouped into different business areas according to their 
market focus (e.g. Consumer Businesses or Communications Businesses) and divided 
into smaller business lines (BLs) of similar products. The SBUs formulated the 
product’s global strategy and allocated resources in line with the targets agreed by 
divisional management. Moreover, they communicated with key executives from 
strategic customers and suppliers. The BLs’ responsibility was more operational in 
nature: they implemented the SBU strategy in a designated product or market 
segment, and were responsible for product management, new product development, 
quality and logistics, production, and global marketing. The SBUs and BLs were 
physically active in the various functional facilities of Semiconductors all over the 
world, with SBU and BL staff members physically located there. 
• The process SBUs consisted of two SBUs with a specific focus on operations: 
Production, on the one hand, and Assembly and Testing, on the other. The Production 
SBU grouped together most production plants, while most assembly and test facilities 
belonged to the Assembly and Testing SBU. When capacity was limited, the 
Production SBUs and the Assembly and Testing SBU tried to find suitable external 
subcontracting parties. Besides these two operational SBUs, there was also a third 
central unit, the International Marketing and Sales Organization, which consisted of 
the regional and national sales organizations. 
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In the matrix organization the BLs made use of the various functional facilities of 
Semiconductors by subcontracting operational tasks to the production plants and the 
assembly and test facilities. Similarly, the BLs subcontracted sales to the various sales 
organizations around the world and organized marketing together with the International 
Marketing and Sales Organization. Planning and coordination were essential: as soon as the 
volumes were known, the BL contacted the operational SBUs so that product needs could be 
translated into specific technologies. 
 
The Tax-Compliant TP Policy 
The MNE faced different TP regulations in the various countries in which it operated. 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the US had created the most stringent and detailed 
jurisdiction, accompanied by numerous TP audits and heavy penalties for non-compliance. 
The European and Asian countries in which the MNE operated had also expended efforts to 
implement the OECD TP Guidelines. However, these countries showed significant 
differences in the training levels of their tax officials and the intensity with which TP audits 
were undertaken (Eden 1998; Ernst and Young 2001, 2003, 2005). The MNE’s Corporate 
Tax department responded to the tax compliance pressures in the various countries by 
adopting a single, comprehensive TP policy. While different TP methods were required at 
different stages in the value chain, Semiconductors had chosen to apply these methods in a 
uniform way for all similar transactions, independently of the countries involved in the 
transfer. By using this uniform policy, the company wanted to demonstrate that it did not 
leave any room for tax manipulation. The Corporate Tax department justified 
Semiconductors’ TP policy in a substantial document, explaining in detail how, among other 
things, the TP policy respected the OECD TP Guidelines and the arm’s length principle 
(Cools et al. 2008). Since purely negotiated transfer prices were not allowed for tax 
compliance reasons, the TP policy was imposed upon the businesses by divisional 
management. As a proof of the business fundamentals of the TP policy and the absence of tax 
avoidance, Semiconductors stressed its use of a single set of books, both for tax compliance 
and for management control issues. 
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In terms of TP methods, Semiconductors applied the cost-plus method in 
manufacturing and the resale-minus method in sales (see Figure 3). Since the number of 
production steps undertaken in a particular plant varied, Semiconductors calculated and used 
a cost-plus price for every step in the manufacturing process, whether the next activity took 
place in the same plant or not9. The transfer price between operational units was the sum of 
the prices for all steps already undertaken. ‘Production’ prices consisted of budgeted costs 
increased by a uniform, fixed profit mark-up. ‘Assembly’ and ‘test’ prices included a 
uniform, fixed, but lower, profit mark-up on top of the budgeted costs. The transfer price 
between an assembly and test facility and a regional sales organization was the aggregate of 
production, assembly and test costs plus profit mark-ups. The transfer price between regional 
and national sales organizations was the resale price minus a uniform, fixed profit margin. 
‘Resale’ transfer prices used the lowest profit margin percentage since the sales activities 
involved the lowest levels of investment, risk, and complexity of the functions undertaken. 
The profit percentages were based on a detailed functional analysis applied to the interacting 
parties. 
Insert Figure 3 About Here 
The delivery of services was covered by a cost-plus transfer price under a General 
Services Agreement, which also covered the costs of the BLs. Semiconductors used budgeted 
costs to prevent manufacturing inefficiencies from being passed on to other parts of the value 
chain (Horngren et al. 2006). Because most tax authorities require the use of actual costs, an 
explicitly documented adjustment was made at the end of the fiscal year10. Divisional 
management explained that the differences in the underlying processes were reflected in the 
different cost bases to which the mark-up percentages were applied. Similarly, they argued 
that applying different percentages to the same sales function in the different countries would 
be impossible to manage: 
 
“We are convinced that a TP system that used a specific mark-up for every 
different product would become too confusing given the wide variety of 
semiconductors produced and sold.” (Semiconductors divisional controller) 
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The tax-compliant transfer prices were most visible along the functional axis of 
Semiconductors’ matrix structure, where they determined the invoice prices between the 
functional entities. At an aggregate level, they contributed to the results of the geographical 
sites, which were of particular interest to the national tax authorities. Along the product axis, 
transfer prices influenced the results of the SBUs and BLs, which were responsible for 
steering the semiconductors through the value chain. From the moment the products were 
sent from the product bank to an assembly and test facility, the production transfer price 
became a cost for the BL. Similarly, the BLs paid for the assembly and test activities, for the 
sales efforts, and for the use of particular services.  As such, TP played a role in performance 
measurement and evaluation, as will be explained below. 
 
RESPONSIBILITY ACCOUNTING AT SEMICONDUCTORS 
In this section we analyze responsibility accounting issues in terms of the different 
aspects of organizational architecture: 1) decision rights related to sourcing and pricing, 2) 
measurement and evaluation of subunit managers’ performance, and 3) rewarding and 
punishment system (Jensen 1983; Eccles 1986; Jensen and Meckling 1992; Zimmerman 
2003). We will pay attention to managerial preferences in light of the actual set-up of the 
responsibility centers for the BLs, the different plants, and the sales organizations. The 
uniform, tax-compliant transfer prices of the Product Division Semiconductors incorporated a 
profit margin to ensure that the arm’s length principle was respected. As a consequence all 
units were formally presented as profit centers. From a management control point of view, 
however, we observed that these organizational units were not all actually treated as profit 
centers. Table 3 summarizes our discussion for the different organizational units. 
Insert Table 3 About Here 
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Business Lines 
The BLs acted as “entrepreneurs” along the product axis – they managed their supply 
chain and had some degree of autonomy to look for outside suppliers. They received a market 
price for their products and were responsible for the costs incurred. In line with managerial 
preferences, the BLs were evaluated as profit centers related to their global profits: 
 
“EBIT is the profit level measured at the BL and calculated as: sales, 
deducting selling costs, deducting BL costs, deducting production transfer 
prices, test transfer prices, and assembly transfer prices. So TP comes in, but 
it is usually fixed anyway.” (BL controller) 
 
BL managers explained that a single transfer price did not have a major impact on 
their financial performance, as it was only one of the many factors influencing their bottom 
line result. As in the other Semiconductors subunits, the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) played a 
central role in the BL’s managerial performance measurement and reward system. Financial 
and customer-related measures were imposed by divisional management while internal 
process measures and competence measures were managed at SBU level. The BSC 
influenced target setting11 and managerial bonuses. As for all subunits, if a BL manager did 
not meet his financial targets, he would not receive the related bonus. If he did not reach his 
non-financial targets but could provide a reasonable explanation, he would still get that part 
of the bonus (cf. Bonus System manual). The tax-compliant TP policy did not fundamentally 
alter the BL’s organizational structure but BL managers stressed that the strict monitoring of 
the TP policy by Corporate Tax had taken away their freedom to negotiate transfer prices 
with other Semiconductors subunits. 
Along the functional axis the BLs were only virtual organizations since BL managers 
physically worked at the different functional entities. Since this meant that the BLs were not 
incorporated as separate legal entities, they were not scrutinized by the tax authorities. Along 
the functional axis, the charges for BL activities were determined on the basis of the General 
Services Agreement: their R&D and overhead expenses were covered as a profit mark-up on 
the transfer prices between the production plants and the assembly and test plants. 
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Production Plants 
Two different types of plants operated in Semiconductors’ production environment: 
the older plants, characterized by mature technological processes, and newer plants using the 
most advanced technology. Most plants were ‘mature’ in that they had been in use for a long 
time. Before the implementation of the matrix structure, these plants used to be part of one 
particular BL: 
 
“We used to feel responsible for providing our BL with the best possible 
quality at the lowest possible price.” (plant manager) 
 
They were used to acting as cost centers and a transfer price covering their full costs 
was their logical choice. In contrast, the factories with the most advanced and unique 
processes, undertaking their own R&D activities, had only been built and used over a shorter 
period of time. 
 
“We are not as closely linked to a particular BL as the mature plants … 
We operate in a more independent way.” (manager of an advanced plant) 
 
In fact, they acted like profit centers and preferred a transfer price that allowed them 
to cover their costs while also adding a profit margin. Under the tax-compliant TP policy, 
both types of plants received a cost-plus transfer price for the semiconductors-in-progress. 
Consequently, each production plant showed a profit margin being realized along both the 
functional and the product axes. 
With the introduction of the matrix structure, the mature plants were decoupled from 
the BLs and grouped together under the Production SBU. We observe two phases since the 
set-up of the Production SBU. In a first phase, the Production SBU continued to evaluate the 
older plants as cost centers. Since the profit mark-ups were identical for all similar stages 
within the production process, they had no particular meaning for evaluating the plants’ 
performance. By stimulating the mature plants to lower the transfer price by a given 
percentage per year, Semiconductors actually asked them to lower manufacturing costs. 
Semiconductors management used global benchmarks to drive the plants towards worldwide 
competitive manufacturing costs.  
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Except for their cost responsibilities, the older plants had limited autonomy: they had 
no freedom to serve external customers, modify their product mix or change prices towards 
their BL customers.  
In a second phase, Semiconductors management modified these plants’ responsibility 
center designation into profit centers. The introduction of the profit mark-ups inspired a 
number of senior managers to turn all plants into real profit centers, also for MCS purposes: 
 
“Plants are just not properly motivated if they are only evaluated based on 
costs.” (industrial planner at the Production SBU) 
 
Furthermore, 
“…the contribution margin also creates a surplus for future investment 
projects. A narrow focus on reducing transfer prices would lead the mature 
plants to squeeze out costs without paying sufficient attention to 
technological innovation.” (Semiconductors divisional controller) 
 
Unlike the older plants, the newer plants had immediately been treated as profit 
centers. These plants were called “foundries,” having more freedom and acting more like 
independent plants. The value added created with their technology led to intellectual property 
guarded at the plant. Managers of these plants further reported they had some freedom in 
taking make-or-buy decisions. As long as technology was not mature, the plant’s ability to 
deliver a certain technology was of primary importance. As the cost structure changed 
constantly, it became difficult to use transfer prices for setting cost reduction targets or for 
benchmarking the different plants – which was the case for the mature plants. 
In contrast to the situation in the BLs, particular transfer prices had a significant 
influence on the revenue of the plants.  All production plants had their own income statement 
and balance sheets. Divisional management followed up on the bottom line results. However, 
in the first phase, they focused on the cost and related operational targets when evaluating the 
managers of the mature plants and on profit and operational targets when evaluating the 
managers of the newer plant. In the second phase, profit also received a much higher weight 
among the bonus targets of the mature plants. 
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Assembly and Test Plants 
Due to the cost-plus method, the assembly and test plants formed—at least pro-
forma—profit centers. But as for the mature production plants, Semiconductors management 
treated assembly and test plants as cost centers for management control. This set-up was in 
line with their treatment in the past and conformed to managerial preferences. Assembly and 
test facilities received sourcing and pricing instructions from their Chief Operational Officer. 
The plants were evaluated based on their achievement of assembly and test cost targets 
measured as indices. At the end of the year their cost reduction performance was compared to 
the budgeted, benchmarked costs used in the TP model. Plants with an index of less than 100 
percent were performing well (they had incurred lower than budgeted costs), while plants 
with an index of more than 100 percent had exceeded the budget. The same system was in 
place as in the mature production plants: 
 
“Once the plant is built and the technological base installed, we just use the 
TP models to calculate the prices. The better the plant is managed, the 
more the costs can decrease, and the transfer prices will then decrease, too. 
And I am in favor of low transfer prices because they imply that the 
underlying costs are low.” (BL manager) 
 
In other words, assembly and test transfer prices had to be reduced continuously12. In 
the financial statements that were prepared for the assembly and test plants, TP had a 
significant influence on revenue and cost of transferred-in components. Following up on the 
developments in the mature plants, divisional management was considering the conversion of 
these pro-forma profit centers into real profit centers at the time of the interviews. 
 
Regional and National Sales Organizations 
Along the functional axis, the regional sales organizations formed the buffer between 
Semiconductors’ large, technology-driven cost basis and the heavily fluctuating sales prices 
in the semiconductor market. It meant that, along this axis, the entrepreneurial risks were 
concentrated in the regional sales organizations managing the physical distribution processes 
and taking responsibility for commercial inventories and related obsolescence risks. The 
MCS focus, however, became clear from the perspective of the product axis.  
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Here, the BL acted as the entrepreneur, while the regional sales organization was 
evaluated in terms of cost efficiency for warehousing and related operational objectives. 
These cost center targets were in accordance with managerial preferences. Again, TP had a 
significant influence on the financial BSC measures of the regional sales organizations as it 
determined its costs and revenues. 
The national sales organizations were in a different situation. They used to act as 
profit centers in the past, with quite a lot of freedom to negotiate transfer prices with the BLs. 
Under the tax-compliant TP policy, they now received a fixed profit margin based on the 
resale-minus method. From a management control perspective, the national sales 
organizations became sales agents whose main responsibility was to achieve predetermined 
sales volumes and to obtain the highest prices in the market: 
 
“… sales and sales volume are important … It was different in the past: for 
years, national sales organizations were evaluated based on EBIT, which put 
pressure on the TP system. They would ask for lower transfer prices, so that 
their profit could be increased … This whole discussion has been stopped, 
and now every selling organization gets a fixed profit percentage. This means 
that the confusion between the taxable, local and global results has been 
resolved and that national sales managers have no interest in manipulation 
anymore.” (Semiconductors’ vice president/SBU controller) 
 
Since their performance measurement and reward system reflected the revenue center 
system, national sales managers did not express any dissatisfaction with the situation as it 
was. 
In sum, Semiconductors’ local subunits were presented as profit centers for tax 
compliance due to the profit mark-up/margin formally attributed to all of them. From a 
management control perspective, the Product Division maintained a variety of responsibility 
center types. The positive and negative influences of tax compliance on Semiconductors’ 
responsibility accounting system are discussed below. 
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DISCUSSION 
In this section, we analyze our field observations in light of the questions raised by the 
analytical TP literature. More specifically, we focus on the use of one versus multiple sets of 
books, tax compliance as a constraint or a decision variable, and the use of alternative 
performance measures. Semiconductors had decided to use one set of TP books for both tax 
compliance and management control, and this primarily for two reasons. The main reason 
was to facilitate justification of the TP policy towards the tax authorities. Like many MNEs 
(Ernst and Young 2003), the MNE in our study was convinced that in case of a TP audit it 
would be in a better position to defend its TP policy if it could prove that the level of its 
transfer prices was based on managerial and business considerations. The second reason was 
to promote simplicity and avoid the confusion that managers might experience if two separate 
sets of books were used. Because of the geographical spread and the size of this MNE, 
administrative manageability (Eccles 1985), transparency, and ease of understanding the TP 
policy (Borkowski 1990, 1992a, b) turned out to be even more relevant than what we know 
from the TP literature on domestically operating firms. Further, tax compliance was 
considered as a constraint in the case MNE. While analytic TP studies take a static approach 
and search for optimal transfer prices (e.g. Narayanan and Smith 2000; Baldenius et al. 2004; 
Hyde and Choe 2005), the case observations directed our attention to the dynamics: the TP 
policy was continuously challenged and the MNE kept searching for the right way to cope 
with the different TP objectives. They designed their TP policy in terms of tax minimization, 
management control and other objectives within the boundaries of what was allowed by TP 
tax regulations worldwide. While Semiconductors management stressed the importance of 
management control and took it into account in the various rounds of designing its tax-
compliant TP policy (Cools et al. 2008), the MCS objective was subordinate to tax 
compliance. In this sense, the survey results by Tang and Chan (1979), Yunker (1982), and 
Tang (1992) indicating the high importance of tax issues among transfer pricing objectives 
are still relevant today. To shed light on the importance of alternative performance measures 
in this MNE, we touch upon the issue of responsibility accounting. Textbooks and the extant 
literature tend to present responsibility center designation as a consistent choice: if a business 
unit is a profit center, then it must be a profit center for all purposes. We observed, however, 
that the MNE was able to formally present its local subunits as profit centers while at the 
same time treating them as mixed responsibility centers.  
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In the context of this mixed responsibility center treatment at our research site, we 
identify four key influences of tax compliance on management control. Table 4 summarizes 
this discussion. 
Insert Table 4 About Here 
Elimination of Negotiation in Transfer Pricing 
Since negotiating transfer prices does not provide a sufficient and valid proof of arm’s 
length TP, Corporate Tax no longer allowed Semiconductors subunits managers to negotiate 
transfer prices. They wanted to avoid giving any signal of potential TP manipulations towards 
the tax authorities. The ban on TP negotiation is striking, since the extant literature (cf. Hyde 
and Choe 2005) does not take into account this potential consequence of tax compliance. All 
interviewees becoming subject to a full profit center treatment complained that they 
experienced the inability to negotiate transfer prices as incompatible with their responsibility 
to behave as autonomous profit centers. We observed that managers of the former real profit 
centers suffered most from the change. National sales managers explained that they missed 
their former entrepreneurial freedom to negotiate transfer prices within a certain range. 
Similarly, the BL managers would have preferred to be able to continue to negotiate transfer 
prices with the factories and the sales organizations 
 
“A closer co-operation between the businesses and the manufacturing plants 
would have been preferred, involving negotiation in determining TP. This 
structure should be aligned to the business axis in a pro-active way.” (BL 
manager) 
 
These undesirable motivational effects caused by the tax compliance requirement 
shed a different light on the importance attached to the role of inter- and intra-firm 
negotiations related to TP and organizational form (Holmstrom and Tirole 1991) and on the 
recommendation to let all BL managers enter into TP negotiations so that “no one is unfairly 
burdened by internal transfers of goods and services” (Simons 2000). So, clearly, on the one 
hand, profit center managers experienced the reduction in their sense of autonomy as 
psychologically disagreeable.  
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On the other hand, the lack of negotiation power was sometimes even economically 
harmful. One BL manager explained how he had felt discouraged from entering the Chinese 
market with one type of semiconductor, since the manufacturing transfer prices induced too 
high a price for the region. Having been allowed to negotiate, he would have been able to 
reduce his cost, to enter the Chinese market while displaying a reasonable result, and the 
MNE could have benefitted from a first mover advantage. Under the tax compliant TP policy, 
adjustments in the official transfer prices were not allowed, except after thorough 
consultation with Corporate Tax and Semiconductors management based on a documented 
motivation. Despite these two negative influences on the MCS, divisional management 
stressed the positive impact of the abolishment of negotiation in terms of significantly 
reduced bargaining costs. Negotiations between BLs and sales organizations used to lead to 
continuous discussions, which were now avoided. 
 
The Use of Uniform Profit Mark-Ups and Margins 
Supported by Corporate Tax, Semiconductors had chosen to build uniform profit 
mark-ups and margins in its global TP policy. Again, the trigger was tax compliance: the 
uniform TP policy allowed Semiconductors to increase the defensibility of its TP policy 
worldwide. It was meant to prove that transfer prices were not manipulated in the context of 
different national corporate income tax rates. It also enhanced the understandability to the tax 
authorities and the traceability of the transfer prices along the value chain. In addition, from a 
MCS perspective, administrative simplification was welcomed in the complex 
Semiconductors environment. 
 
“The TP policy would become confusing both to explain to the tax 
authorities and for internal use.” (Corporate Tax director) 
 
On the other hand, the implementation of the global, uniform TP policy triggered 
considerable debate in the context of the national sales organizations. Acting as profit centers 
in the past, they were now evaluated as revenue centers, with sales and sales volume as the 
major financial performance measures. The fixed profit percentage in the resale-minus 
transfer price eliminated any need for sales managers to put pressure on the TP system, but it 
also hid the distinction between higher and lower margin products, as reflected in this 
interview with Semiconductors’ vice president, also SBU controller: 
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“We are currently discussing whether it is good to evaluate national sales 
organizations based on sales volume, and whether the evaluation should not 
be based on margins, on product mix. From a managerial point of view it 
makes sense to investigate whether the sales parties get the maximum value 
out of the market. I stress this is a managerial, not a tax-related issue … 
This current discussion would again open up the way towards more 
dialogue between the BL and the national sales organizations, so that a 
higher margin can be squeezed out of the market. It would lead to different 
margin targets in the countries and in the regions. However, the 
consequence is that sales managers might ask again for the transfer prices to 
be adapted. But such an adjustment of transfer prices is what we at SBU 
level want to avoid.” 
 
The use of uniform margins, in combination with the conversion of the national sales 
organizations from profit centers into revenue centers, gave suboptimal incentives to sales 
managers and had negative effects in terms of sales effectiveness. It shows that the chosen tax 
compliant policy could lead to suboptimal business decisions, even when performance 
measures independent of the transfer price are used as an alternative way to disentangle the 
tax and MCS objectives of TP (Smith 2002b). Similar examples were not apparent related to 
the manufacturing environment, in which the cost center structure had been in place for a 
long time and the conversion into a new type of responsibility center was only about to start. 
 
Mixed Responsibility Center Treatment 
The matrix structure and the uniform TP policy, both triggered by tax compliance, 
allowed Semiconductors to have a mixed responsibility accounting system in place. 
Corporate and divisional managers were convinced that the formalization using a two-
dimensional matrix structure provided them with a solid defense of the dual responsibility 
treatment towards the tax authorities. The national tax authorities scrutinized the functional 
axis of the matrix since this axis contained the physical units that were located in their 
respective countries. The invoices sent along the functional axis respected the OECD TP 
methods and incorporated an appropriate profit margin, as sustained by the functional 
analysis documented in the official TP document.  
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The product axis was not important for the tax authorities because it only represented 
from a different angle the same activities that were already covered by the functional axis. 
Along the product axis, SBUs/BLs and their managers could therefore be evaluated on 
different levels of financial responsibilities. The implementation of the uniform profit mark-
ups allowed Semiconductors to introduce the profit center structure with transfer prices that 
were both internally and externally benchmarked, while still treating mature plants and 
assembly and test facilities as cost centers for management control. The national sales 
organizations used to be profit centers. However, given the fluctuating final market prices, 
the sales agents would constantly try to negotiate the transfer prices. In order to alleviate the 
pressure on the TP system, the national sales organizations were converted into de facto 
revenue centers. While subunit managers were satisfied with the dual treatment that respected 
their responsibility center preferences, higher level management feared that the resulting 
complexity in the MCS would lead to ambiguity and confusion at the lower levels in the 
organization. Apart from Eccles’ (1986) empirical illustrations that the notion of a ‘profit 
center’ can cover a variety of degrees of authority and autonomy of subunit managers (Vancil 
1979), the practice of mixed responsibility center structures has not been described in the 
literature before. 
 
Conversion of Pro-Forma Profit Centers into Real Profit Centers 
Under the mixed system, all Semiconductors subunits were presented as profit 
centers, while most manufacturing plants and the national sales organizations were only 
profit centers pro forma. Still, a spill-over effect of the arm’s length focus turned out to be 
that divisional management started to consider the implementation of real profit centers for 
all Semiconductors subunits, even if this was not legally required. Higher-level management 
became convinced that the elimination of the mixed treatment and the further reduction of 
complexity would allow them to do a better job in steering subunit managers. Since the profit 
mark-ups were allocated for tax compliance anyway, divisional management perceived it as a 
small step to move towards real profit centers, with the aim of creating a shift in subunit 
mentality. The restructuring towards the matrix structure had meant that the mature plants 
were detached from the BL to which they used to be dedicated. Now, the plants needed to 
learn to think further than cost efficiency alone, and consider how they could create value in 
order to build up a buffer for future investments (cf. Eccles 1986; Holmstrom and Tirole 
1991).  
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A profit center emphasis would help them to evolve towards a mentality of offering 
their services to different BLs, maybe also to outside customers. Besides, divisional 
management saw additional tax compliance reasons for the shift towards real profit centers. 
This conversion would further improve the transparency of the whole TP policy and it would 
further support the “”substance over form” principle, which is relevant in international 
taxation13 (Larking 2005). 
Consequently, divisional management started to include an increasing number of 
profit center characteristics in the subunits’ responsibility center structure. At all levels within 
the Product Division, the financial measures received the highest weight in the bonus 
contract, with EBIT and Economic Value Added (EVA14) becoming increasingly important 
in the managerial performance measurement and reward system. To stress the significance of 
these financial aspects, no bonuses were awarded when managers failed to achieve their 
financial targets, even if these targets were influenced by TP issues beyond their control. 
When divisional management communicated its decision to reorganize all plants into profit 
centers, plant managers reacted strongly: 
 
“It cuts up the organization into too many separate departments, each one 
trying to make as much profit as possible. This could lead to a situation where 
the plants realize a profit while the BLs do not sell anything and incur losses. 
It creates a lot of friction in the organization… I am only a producer, I don’t 
“own” the products. I do not feel like a real entrepreneur.” (plant manager) 
 
“I am against these internal discussions of lowering and raising transfer prices 
as they are a waste of time. It does not make sense to have a profit model for 
the manufacturing plants.” (plant manager) 
 
“Semiconductors has gone back and forth between plant models, and under 
the latest model, there is not really any collaboration with the plants and the 
BLs, which are restricted from going outside the company.” (BL manager) 
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While these reactions reflect the managers’ fear, we observed that the former cost 
center managers resisted the change because they did not experience a matching increase in 
autonomy (in terms of pricing or of sourcing) that would enable them to really act as profit 
center managers. For them, the shift to profit centers led to a psychologically disagreeable 
situation. 
During the internal debates and the discussions with Corporate Tax, it became clear 
that the hardest task for divisional management was to find the right balance between the 
different components of organizational architecture under the tax compliance constraint. This 
was especially relevant to the issue of matching the decision rights and responsibilities of the 
subunits managers with the performance measurement and reward system (Jensen 1983; 
Jensen and Meckling 1992; Zimmerman 2003). While Eccles and White (1988) emphasize 
the need to let the supplying division earn a share of the total contribution margin for fairness 
reasons, the managers of the mature plants felt unfairly treated because they were held 
accountable for elements outside their span of control. Giving the subunits a large amount of 
authority for pricing and sourcing was impossible because of the rigidity created by tax 
compliance and because the elimination of the freedom to negotiate transfer prices 
undermined subunits managers’ ability to behave as real profit center managers. We conclude 
that TP tax compliance provides MNE top management with an incentive to turn all 
responsibility centers into profit centers despite the fact that this structure does not match the 
real span of accountability over revenues and costs in tax-compliant MNEs. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The main goal of our research was to explore how TP tax compliance impacts 
responsibility accounting choices in an MNE that uses one set of TP books. From a tax point 
of view, the arm’s length principle requires MNEs to treat the different legal entities as if 
they were independent, profit-maximizing companies. The arm’s length approach is, 
therefore, associated with the profit center organization known from the MCS literature. 
However, from an MCS point of view, the set-up of different types of responsibility centers 
might be more desirable. Given the lack of empirical research on this topic, we undertook an 
in-depth case study in one MNE. A first observation is that negotiation in TP was eliminated, 
since it could provide signals of TP manipulations towards the tax authorities.  
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Managers of the profit centers experienced this loss of autonomy as demotivating and 
sometimes even hindering economically sound decision making. Second, the MNE simplified 
its tax compliant TP policy to such an extent that it installed uniform profit margins and 
mark-ups for all similar stages in the firm’s value chain. While this simplification was 
welcomed from an administrative point of view, it could again lead to suboptimal decision 
making. Third, tax compliance imposed a profit center designation on all subunits, also on the 
ones that would benefit from a cost or revenue center approach from a MCS point of view. At 
first, the firm coped with managers’ preferences for responsibility centers by a mixed 
treatment of the pro-forma profit centers, allowing them to be profit centers for tax purposes 
and cost or revenue centers for MCS purposes. However, top management started to see the 
benefits of profit-center treatment for all purposes as a way to reduce the complexity of the 
whole TP policy (both towards subunit managers and towards the tax authorities) and to 
increase the strength of its “substance over form”. Consequently, they started to convert the 
pro-forma profit centers into real profit centers. 
This paper contributes to the literature in various ways. First, it adds to the limited 
empirical tradition in responsibility accounting research (Merchant 1987; Rowe et al. 2007). 
Contrary to what we might expect based on the literature, divisional and subunit managers 
had lively discussions on responsibility accounting in the context of TP. They expended 
significant effort to find the best way to reconcile the management control versus tax 
compliance objectives of the TP policy by continuously adjusting the organizational 
structure. The use of a mixed responsibility center structure observed in our case has not been 
documented in the literature before. Second, this paper contributes to the research 
documenting and explaining how the MCS is designed and used under the constraint of 
external environmental pressures (Chenhall 2003). Previous research on performance 
evaluation and rewards at the profit center level found indications that managers in profit 
centers are often dissatisfied with the TP system, but did not provide reasons for this 
dissatisfaction (Merchant et al. 1995). Our case shows that tax compliance forced the MNE’s 
subunits into a real or pro-forma profit center set-up, while they did not consider themselves 
to be profit center entrepreneurs. Third, the results of our study are also relevant for policy 
development. Tax authorities not only wish to stop tax evasion and manipulation, but also 
prevent double taxation, while MNEs seek to comply with regulations but also to create after-
tax shareholder value.  
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We provide the first insights on the consequences of the arm’s length principle for 
internal decision-making, performance evaluation, and managerial motivation against the 
backdrop of these broad tensions (Eden, 1998; Hamaekers, 2001). 
Finally, we would like to acknowledge the limitations of an in-depth case study within 
a single MNE. A potential extension of this research would be to compare and contrast the 
TP systems of different MNEs. A large-scale study involving semi-structured interviews in 
combination with a questionnaire survey might help achieve this goal. In future research our 
study could be extended not only towards MNEs that are different in terms of organizational 
structure, sector, size, etc., but also towards MNEs that use two sets of TP books. In his latest 
analysis of several MNEs using two sets of books, Tang (2002) observed few internal 
conflicts between the tax and management control objectives of the TP systems. However, 
given the conflicts identified by Eccles (1985) and Eden (2003), we would like to call for a 
more comprehensive and detailed study to help us understand under what circumstances the 
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Manufacturing environment: Cost (C) + uniform, fixed profit mark-up (a15 or b16) 
Sales environment: Resale price (R) – uniform, fixed profit margin (c17) 
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 The mark-up of a% used to calculate production transfer prices reflected the characteristics of the production 
process: high-risk investment levels, highly volatile product portfolios, a short product lifecycle, a long 
throughput time, the importance of loading effects, an important increase in the product’s value, and the 
involvement of highly qualified and trained personnel.  
16
 The mark-up of b% was determined by the characteristics of the assembly and test activities: a high 
investment level, a volatile product portfolio, a short product lifecycle, a short throughput time, important 
loading effects, and a significant added value of the products. Compared to production, assembly and testing 
involved quite simple processes so that the requirements in terms of personnel were low. The differences in the 
functional risk profile between production and the assembly and test activities motivated Semiconductors to use 
a lower profit mark-up for assembly and testing than for production.  
17
 The profit margin of c% was a lower percentage than the profit mark-up percentages used for production, 
assembly and test activities: the national sales organizations bore the currency risk and the debtors’ risk from the 
sales to the final customer but the investment level was low. In addition, since no inventories passed through the 




Summary of interview data used for analysis 
 
Interviews 





In-depth case interviews: 46.5 hours 23 individuals 
at corporate level   
involving Tax director and Tax managers  3 
Quality Director  1 
Internal auditor for Semiconductors  1 
at divisional level   
involving Controller  1 
Plant controllers  2 
Industrial planner  1 
General plant managers  2 
at SBU level   
involving  Controllers  2 
at BL level   
involving General managers  2 
Controller  4 
Logistics manager  1 




Types of archival documents used for analysis 
 
 
111 documents used, prepared between December 1993 and July 2001 
Documents 
Type MNE document External document 
Organization charts Internal  
Flow charts of logistics chain Internal  
Annual report  Published information 
Company description  Published in annual report 
MNE website  Public information 
Official Transfer Pricing documents Internal Confidential: only for tax authorities 
Memoranda on transfer pricing  Prepared for tax regulatory bodies 
Transfer pricing price models Internal/confidential  
Price calculations Internal Excel file  
Administrative Transfer Pricing instructions Internal/confidential  
Memos Internal  
Minutes of meeting Internal  
Internal letters Internal  
Discussion notes Internal  
Emails Internal  
Emails: follow-up on interviews  Sent to the researcher 
Internal memoranda Internal/confidential  
Faxes Internal  
BSC of subunit Internal  
Performance evaluation of plant Internal  
Target allocation schemes Internal/confidential  
Bonus agreements Internal/confidential  
Performance appraisals Internal  
Slide shows Internal  
Market and business outlook  From industry association 
Slide show  From consultants 





Types of responsibility centers in the Product Division Semiconductors 
 Along the functional axis: 
tax compliance focus 
Along the product axis: 
MCS focus 
BLs - Invisible to the tax 
authorities because they 
were embedded in the 
functional units. BL costs 
were compensated under the 
General Services 
Agreement. 
- Profit centers (in accordance with managerial preferences) 
with 
1) limited sourcing autonomy/ no pricing autonomy, 
2) evaluation based on bottom line responsibility/ 
profit targets, 
3) bonus paid for strict attainment of financial targets, 
less strict interpretation of meeting other targets. 
Production 
plants 
- Profit centers with their 
own income statements and 
balance sheets. 
- Invoiced the assembly and 
test plants with cost-plus 
transfer prices. 
- Plants with mature technology were converted from cost 
centers (managerial preference) into profit centers with 
1) no sourcing autonomy/ no pricing autonomy, 
2) evaluation initially based on cost and related 
operational targets; recent shift towards profit 
targets, 
3) bonus paid for strict attainment of financial targets, 
less strict interpretation of meeting other targets. 
- Plants operating with the latest technology were profit 
centers (in accordance with managerial preferences) with 
1) some sourcing autonomy/no pricing autonomy, 
2) evaluation based on profit targets, 
3) bonus paid for strict attainment of financial targets, 
less strict interpretation of meeting other targets. 
Assembly and 
test plants 
- Profit centers with their 
own income statements and 
balance sheets. 
- invoiced the regional sales 
organizations with cost-plus 
transfer prices. 
- Cost centers (in accordance with managerial preferences) 
with 
1) no sourcing autonomy/ no pricing autonomy, 
2) evaluation based on cost and related operational 
targets, 
3) bonus paid for strict attainment of financial targets, 
less strict interpretation of meeting other targets. 
Regional sales 
organizations 
- Profit centers with their 
own income statements and 
balance sheets. 
- paid a cost-plus transfer 
price to the assembly and 
test facilities and received 
the resale-minus transfer 
price from the national sales 
organizations. 
- Cost centers (in accordance with managerial preferences) 
with 
1) no sourcing autonomy/ no pricing autonomy, 
2) evaluation based on cost and related operational 
targets, 
3) bonus paid for strict attainment of financial targets, 
less strict interpretation of meeting other targets. 
National sales 
organizations 
- Profit centers with their 
own income statements and 
balance sheets. 
- Received a resale-minus 
transfer price from the 
regional sales organizations. 
- Converted from profit centers (managerial preference) into 
revenue centers with 
1) no sourcing autonomy/ no pricing autonomy, 
2) evaluation used to focus on profit and related sales 
targets; Now strictly on sales and related targets, 
3) bonus paid for strict attainment of financial targets, 
less strict interpretation of meeting other targets. 
 
45 
TABLE 4: Influences of TP tax compliance on responsibility accounting in the Product Division Semiconductors 




Resulting effects on management control 
Negative effects Positive effects 
1. Elimination of 
negotiation in TP 
Reduction in the sense of autonomy -  psychologically 
disagreeable: 
- The profit center managers did not feel like real entrepreneurs when not 
being able to negotiate their transfer price. 
 
Potentially economically harmful: 
- BLs could end up in a situation where it became unattractive for them to 
enter a particular market. 
Significant reduction in bargaining costs: 
- Negotiation between Semiconductors’ subunits used to lead 
to continuous discussions, which were now avoided. 
 
2. Uniform profit 
margins/mark-ups 
Potentially economically harmful decisions: 
- The loss of differentiation in product profitability led to suboptimal business 
decisions at the national sales organizations. 
Significant administrative simplification: 
- The administrative simplification of TP determination was 
not only welcome for tax compliance, but also for 
management control in the complex Semiconductors 
environment. 
3. Mixed responsibility 
center treatment 
Ambiguous situation: 
- The dual situation increased the complexity of Semiconductors’ 
organizational structure. This was thought to be confusing especially by 
higher-level management (not so much by lower-level management). 
Respecting manager’s preferences for various 
types of responsibility centers: 
- Semiconductors was able to hold its managers accountable 
along the responsibility structure of their choice, while 
respecting the profit center designation in terms of the legal 
entities. 
4. Conversion of mixed 
responsibility centers 
(pro-forma profit 
centers) into real 
profit centers 
Resistance by managers who were satisfied with the previous 
mixed responsibility center structure: 
- Psychologically disagreeable situation: The managers of the new profit 
centers did not experience a consistent increase in autonomy. 
Resolving the ambiguity that stemmed from the 
mixed responsibility center structure: 
- Higher-level management was convinced that the elimination 
of ambiguity was beneficial to further reduce the complexity 
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 GlaxoSmithKline and Xilinx have recently experienced how large the impact of charges for non-compliance by the IRS can be (The Economist 2004; Wright 2004, 2007). 
2
 At the same time, the OECD Member States realize that the arm’s length principle has inherent flaws, in that the separate entity approach may not always account for the 
economies of scale and interrelation of diverse activities created by integrated businesses (OECD 1995 §1.9). In addition, associated enterprises may engage in transactions 
that independent enterprises would not undertake and that are not motivated by tax avoidance: members of an MNE group face different commercial circumstances than 
would independent enterprises (OECD 1995 §1.10). 
3
 Definitions of what is understood by one versus two sets of books are also lacking. 
4
 Hilton (2005), Horngren et al. (2006), and Zimmerman (2000) refer to this highest degree of accountability by means of the term ‘investment center’. Following Simons 
(2000) and others, however, we use the term ‘profit center’ for both profit and investment centers. 
5
 Most analytic studies are based on agency theory and usually assume that a central agent takes the TP decisions. This modeling approach was originally aimed at 
investigating the consequences of tax minimization, but more recent analytic studies incorporate the MCS role of TP. 
6
 The cost of conformity is expressed in quantitative terms as the expected after-tax profit with decoupled transfer prices less the expected after-tax profit under conformity 
(Baldenius et al. 2004, 600).  
7
 The interviewer, one of the researchers, audiotaped all face-to-face interviews and wrote down literally what was said during the two telephone interviews.   
8
 As indicated above, a detailed study of these services centers falls outside the scope of this paper.  
9
 As indicated above, production and pre-testing mostly - but not always - took place in the same plant. Assembly and testing could take place in the production plant, or in 
another plant. 
10
 Although the OECD Guidelines list a variety of possibilities for determining the cost basis of the transfer prices, they recommend using ‘historical costs’ (OECD 1995 § 
2.5) out of fear that budgeted costs might be influenced by tax manipulations.   
11
 Targets could be formulated at site or departmental levels and could be either individually or group based, in line with the intentions of the BSC. 
12
 Assembly involved mature technologies. However, testing reflected the differences in technology of the various production processes, meaning that testing could be quite 
complex for the more advanced products. These testing activities were therefore less rigorously evaluated in terms of cost reduction. 
13
 “Substance over form” refers to an anti-avoidance doctrine under which the legal form of an arrangement or transaction is ignored, tax being levied in accordance with the 
economic substance (Larking 2005: 333). 
14
 EVA was calculated by applying a number of corrections to EBIT, particularly for working capital and notably tax. Both corrections were determined centrally and could 
not be influenced locally by the managers under evaluation. 
